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The form of tragedy has been central to philosophical projects since classical antiquity, and it 
gained special critical import as a result of the so-called ‘tragic turning within philosophy’ during 
the Romantic period of German Idealism (see Beistegui 2000). The aim of this short paper is to 
address the notion of aesthetic appearance (semblance, Schein) within aesthetic theory (Theodor 
W. Adorno) and in contemporary tragic theatre (Howard Barker) and to show that the problem of 
semblance re-appears as a productive critical category in the current discourse of performance 
philosophy.  
Howard Barker’s tragic drama (which he calls a ‘theatre of catastrophe’, see Arguments for a 
Theatre) unfolds in a context of post-dramatic and post-metaphysical theatre, and, if one agrees 
with George Steiner’s analysis, it lacks the signifiers of ‘authentic’ tragedy because it develops in a 
cultural context that is devoid of a theological dimension (Steiner 1961, 2008). In Barker’s theatre 
there are no super-human agencies determining the fate of dramatic characters; there is no 
sense of hope or redemption to be discovered in the face of the event of death; there is no 
ethical value system adhered to, and no moral statements (in the form of messages) made about 
the world. Following Nancy, one could argue that it is a theatre that comes ‘after tragedy’ because 
it ‘has no recourse, nor have we, to a higher (or more profound) truth, to which the “tragic” itself 
would open onto as to a possibility, in spite of everything, of making sense, even if it means 
making sense of the relinquishing of sense’ (Nancy 2014, 284). Yet, even for Nancy, the concept of 
tragedy persists in postmodern times, because ‘tragedy itself, already comes after’ (ibid.). It 
comes after the catastrophe, after sacrifice, after the death of God and the crisis of subjectivity. 
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The concept of tragedy implies a dialectical structure of feeling, which Steiner calls ‘alienation’ or 
‘estrangement from life’ (the human experience of loss and of being a stranger to others and to 
oneself). In classical Greek tragedy, for example, the particular actions of a transgressive 
individual (the criminal acts of Medea, for instance, or the unconscious actions of Oedipus) are 
radically alienating gestures which are juxtaposed with the force of universal law, ethics and 
(absolute) power. By emphasising heightened emotional content, danger, radical action, violence 
and suffering, tragedy draws our attention to the singularity, finitude and precariousness of 
human experience. Tragic human experience manifests itself in the form of a limit experience.  
But tragedy is also a structure of thought, a constructed conceptual system of relations between 
singularities; a mode of thinking which plays out its own logic of separation and negation (the 
tragic hero separates him/herself from the world; s/he negates existence and puts meaning on 
trial). In Barker’s theatre in particular, the alienation of the central character is experienced as a 
profoundly individualising process, as a singularity that cannot adequately be thought. Tragedy 
thinks this eventuality of the particular, it thinks it to excess; and in thinking (tragically), thought 
reaches beyond the limits of its own conceptual boundaries and discovers the possibility of 
difference. In classic as well as postmodern tragic theatre, thought undoes itself in its violent 
encounter with immanence in a movement which, as Adorno proposed, draws attention to the 
‘nonidentical’ kernel of the concept. In other words, the thoughts emerging from contingent 
theatrical gestures and actions resist their own logic of domination and transparency; they can 
be called immanent not least because they are (performance) ‘thoughts that do not understand 
themselves’ (Adorno 1974, 192). 
In Barker’s play I Saw Myself (written in 2007) the widowed female protagonist Sleev and her 
servants are in the process of weaving a gigantic tapestry which is to represent a record of the 
country’s heroic political past and a celebration of the current war effort. Sleev, however, resists 
the ideological pressure of depicting glorified universal war-time experiences and attempts to 
insert her own personal and sexually transgressive adventures into the tapestry. She meets 
resistance, fear and hostility from others yet persists in revealing her subversive erotic past. The 
play contains the surrealistic image of a naked man inside a mirrored wardrobe; Sleev’s recurring 
speculations about Adam and Eve’s relationship before and after their expulsion from paradise; 
the women’s painstaking labour of weaving ‘the truth’, which gradually damages their eyesight; 
the imminent catastrophe of an approaching war. The non-linear structural combination of these 
evocative gestures and thought images emphasises the irreconcilable tensions between the 
personal and the political as evoked in the theme of (subjective) reflection and (artistic) 
representation. The looming catastrophic collapse of the characters’ physical world (the kind of 
closure that is threatened by war) is foreshadowed and resisted throughout the play by Sleev’s 
intra- and inter-personal conflicts (her own ‘war’). She finds an imaginative extension of her 
subjective world in and through the reflections provided by the mirror and her sexual partners. 
The reflexive gaze of the self in the mirror and in the ‘other’ provides a kind of reflective opening 
by means of which the circumstances of the present are defiantly challenged, without however 
offering a sense of moral resolution or hope for redemption. In Barker’s work, passion and the 
‘de-civilising experience’ and ‘series of permissions to transgress’ (Barker 1997, 110) which it 
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invites, becomes a theatrical core principle that opposes the achievements and morality of the 
transparent, humanist world of Reason.  
SLEEV: Before the mirror 
 Always 
 Always before the mirror me and once there were no  
 mirrors I have it on authority awful for the women awful 
 for the men when Adam gazed on Eve what Adam saw was 
 never seen by Eve  
(Barker 2008, 13) 
 In an essay on Bizet’s opera Carmen Adorno notes: ‘For in the aesthetic refraction of 
passion subjectivity becomes conscious of itself as nature, and abandons the illusion that it is 
autonomous mind [Geist]’ (Adorno 1998, 63). The subject who desires (in many ways the 
archetypal tragic figure) ‘sees herself’ in those moments of rupture and un-knowing which recall 
the force of uncontrollable nature. ‘SLEEV: With desire came the mirror but the mirror only 
served to deepen the anxiety desire inevitably creates (She looks at herself.)’ (Barker 2008, 14). In 
other words, the aesthetic presentation and appearance of subjectivity as divided, fractured, and 
in the process of self-conscious dissolution suggests a different way of understanding and 
thinking. Self-becoming (or self-recognition) in the process of self-dissolution (a Romantic idea 
which, incidentally, also shaped Friedrich Hölderlin’s theory and practice) does not abandon 
thought to non-conceptual effusion, nor does it deliver speech to silence. Barker’s theatre of 
catastrophe is a very powerful example of the relentless continuity or ordeal of philosophical 
thinking in the face of inexplicable, because uncontainable, human emotions. But, importantly, 
thought’s wrestling with the boundless is translated into the actuality of dramatic stage action 
and therefore becomes material and immanent. ‘The ordeal’, as Nancy states in his discussion of 
the self in Hegel’s philosophy, ‘is that of immanence’ (Nancy 2002, 55).  
The dramatic form of tragedy, primarily due to its theatrical, emphatic, heightened and 
exaggerated form of address (in the form of dramatic speech) performs a negative, resistant 
mode of non-discursive thought which offers us a distinctively immanent and contingent 
perspective on what thinking is or can be. In his discussion of parataxis in the presentation of 
Hölderlin’s poetry (and I argue that Barker’s dramatic language is also paratactical), Adorno draws 
attention to the effect of conceptual spacing as a result of the distinctively constellatory lyric 
technique. The poet disregards syntax, punctuation and the logical ordering of thoughts and thus 
creates a ground or plane of poetic immanence (to borrow and amend Deleuze’s key concept) on 
which thought emerges as thought in direct contact with the object or ‘thing’. Nancy on Hegel 
again (and this, in my opinion, might function as a model for performance philosophy): ‘[t]hought 
is penetration into the thing, a breaking or sinking into the thing’ (Nancy 2002, 19). This 
penetration of the thing by thought (Hegel uses the term ‘spirit’) does not, however, invite 
thought to stop or relinquish itself. On the contrary, contact with materiality and the concrete 
makes thought ‘restless’, self-reflexive and thus able to actualise itself as thought made manifest.  
The problem of manifestation, or to use the related concepts of appearance and semblance, in 
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aesthetic terms has been a concern for philosophers of art since Kant. German Idealism’s 
contribution to the discourse around aesthetic appearance rests on the primary notion that the 
semblance character of the work of art is its ability to reach beyond the limitations of art’s 
material object-ness to suggest the possibility of an ontological difference that is captured by the 
notion of a ‘more’, as Adorno has pointed out (see Adorno 1997). Adorno’s treatment of 
semblance is deeply informed by his reception of the idealist discourse of art and philosophy 
which established a connection between aesthetic appearance and spirit (Geist). In the Hegelian 
tradition the spirit of art is the semblance of something immaterial (of an Idea, the Absolute), but 
it is unable to exist independently from the sensuous, material elements of the artwork, as I have 
discussed above in the context of thought’s relation to the thing. However, the artwork’s Schein 
cannot be identical with the material itself and it cannot be reduced to it, because such an 
identification would extinguish the difference or otherness of the artwork compared to other 
objects of empirical reality. Art as semblance is defined by this crucial element of difference from 
the real or, to use Adorno’s language, by its negativity from that which ‘merely exists’. In Aesthetic 
Theory he writes: ‘Artistic spirit raises itself above what merely exists’ (Adorno 1997, 48). This 
might sound like the opposite of Hegel’s view (via Nancy) that thought must penetrate into the 
thing (that which exists) in order to realise itself as (restless) thought. However, both statements 
are in dialectical relation: by sinking into the materiality of being, thought (spirit) – in order to be 
perceived as such – also, at the same time, raises itself above that into which it is sinking. The 
sinking into the material becomes manifest in thought’s reaching beyond the known and 
contingent towards a possibility and futurity that is not yet defined or circumscribed. The 
‘reaching beyond’, which is triggered by a ‘sinking into’, alone does justice to the infinite singularity 
of that which is given to us in the (theatrically) distinct experience of presence.  
Fredric Jameson’s definition of traditional aesthetic meaning as the ‘subsumption of a particular 
under a general’ (Jameson 1990, 169) refers to the historical trajectory of the concept of aesthetic 
appearance which prepared for the nominalist critique of this development. Jameson’s discussion 
of Adorno’s focus on the ‘crisis and the agony of aesthetic appearance’ (168) draws out the 
conflict between the nominalist desire for immediacy and the domination of the commodity form 
which becomes the new ‘universal’ and absolute, representing the inescapable reality of 
commodification in modern society. From this perspective the crisis of Schein as initiated by 
nominalism signifies not only an end - namely the disintegration of the aura and stable ‘meaning’ 
of the hermetic work of art - but paradoxically also a beginning. The apparent collapse of 
aesthetic meaning and semblance in modernism can be considered as initiating a renewed and 
heightened objectivation of aesthetic processes, which terminate in the fetishised products of the 
culture industry. Fetishisation seems to be the key force in this process. The nominalist focus on 
the particular - the immediate and, in Adornian terms, ‘nonidentical’ element - contains within 
itself a dynamic, the radicalism and futility of which are expressed in its fixation on the contingent 
and the heterogeneous, which for Adorno points towards the deaestheticisation (Entkunstung) of 
art itself. ‘Artworks from which the apparition has been driven out without a trace are nothing 
more than husks, worse than what merely exists, because they are not even useful’ (Adorno 
1997, 107). Hence, in late-capitalist contexts of reification the persistence of aesthetic semblance 
may be conceived as a protest against the mere existence of things; a response to the 
 
130 PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 1 (2015) 
bureaucratic ordering of life.   
While modernist art can be defined as an attempt to overturn the false semblance or illusion 
offered by traditional art – a reaction which led to formal fragmentation in the major modernist 
movements, such as expressionism, surrealism, dada, the developments in atonal music, and so 
forth – Adorno nevertheless defends art’s quality of semblance (Scheincharacter). To him, ‘central 
to aesthetics therefore is the redemption of semblance’ (Adorno 1997, 107) because aesthetic 
semblance is here understood to rescue what the subjective spirit subjugates and dominates, 
namely the nonidentical and the immediate. The mere distance of art from empirical reality and 
heterogeneous nature – and without this distance or difference, however minimal, there would 
be no art – gives art the character of semblance. This is why nominalist critiques of Schein (as 
carried out by modernist avant-garde movements such as Surrealism, Dadaism, and Futurism) 
are critiques of art as such.  
Aesthetic nominalism draws attention to the artwork’s own structural impulse as opposed to an 
aesthetic organisation from a viewpoint ‘above’ or ‘outside’. Adorno’s stipulation that ‘the artwork 
must be organised from below’ following its own ‘immanent movement’ (Adorno 1997, 108) also 
pertains to his understanding of the relationship between art and philosophical thought, for 
thought should also become aware of its immanent movement in relation to the art object or 
event. The reaction of modernist art against aesthetic appearance/illusion (Schein) signifies an 
‘emancipation from the concept of harmony’ (Adorno 1997, 100) which is the central concept of 
traditional, hermetic art. In Barker’s post-metaphysical tragedies, the concept of harmony is 
equally displaced in favour of the dramaturgical principles of contradiction, interruption and 
irresolution.  
Adorno’s and Barker’s critical engagements with the concept of aesthetic harmony reflect their 
views that individual experience in late-capitalist culture has become dangerously diminished – 
this constitutes tragic experience today. Barker proposes that an encounter with tragic theatre 
reveals that ‘the world is inadequate’ (Barker 2005, 33) and ‘wanting’ (40), ‘negative’ in Adornian 
language. But the pain and anxiety (as a ‘condition of tragedy’) thus experienced, simultaneously 
create a longing in the individual for the unknown, a desire which rescues the authenticity of the 
self from its repressive and fateful entanglement in the ‘irrationality of the system’ (Adorno 1974, 
23). If Barker’s theatre can be termed ‘irrational’ – and thus an antagonism to the ‘rational’ liberal-
humanist society, as Charles Lamb (2005) has suggested – its irrationality has to be understood 
dialectically; that is, as an aesthetic refraction of the irrationality of reality, similar to the ways in 
which the darkness of Beckett’s plays is constructed as a mimesis of the darkness of the post-
Auschwitz world.  
Barker’s definition of tragedy, his ‘art of theatre’, combines art’s propensity for transcendence 
and semblance (its drawing near the non-existent, its fascination with the other, its suggestion of 
a ‘more’) with a simultaneous discovery or instinctual and intuitive knowledge that the world is 
meaningless. His work is therefore a contemporary example of Adorno’s call for a changed, post-
metaphysical form of tragedy that neither lays an affirmative claim on the construction of 
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positive meaning through art (by suggesting the possibility of reconciliation or redemption), nor 
does it repudiate the possibility of the impossible. In addition, this changed form of tragedy no 
longer stages the struggle of the particular with the universal (the classic example of tragedy 
where an individual’s particular interests are only perceived as such if placed in opposition to a 
general, universal interest). Tragedy reaches beyond what is merely the case; it welcomes the 
extraordinary, the extreme, the catastrophic; it brings chaos to order. As the brief example from 
Barker’s tragic drama has shown, the protagonist realises herself in the dissolution of her 
particular interests because her main concern is not (or no longer) an attack on the 
instrumentalising logic of the whole (the logic of political power). Her main concern is a 
realisation of her absolute and infinite singularity which, inevitably, is perceived as an attack on 
the whole. She no longer has particular interests to defend or statements to make, she only 
pursues her journey towards her self, which means a journey towards dissolution and death.  
The tragic character’s ‘fascination with death’ (Barker 2005, 71) presents a challenge to the 
imagination by juxtaposing the wrong world with, in Adornian terms, an ‘as if’ scenario of 
possibilities, a semblance of otherness. By challenging the coercive (instrumentalising) 
intelligibility of the world with the enigmatic ‘incomprehensibility of the art-work’, Barker’s art of 
theatre - without passing judgment - exposes the spectator to pain, failure and forbidden desires, 
thus constituting an ‘address’ which returns the individual spectator to him or herself (see 
Düttmann 2003). Furthermore, tragedy’s seductive performance of the ‘ecstasy of vanishing 
meaning’ (Barker 2005, 14) liberates the tragic character from the morality of the collective (which 
defends general interests). Barker’s tragic theatre invites us to think within (by sinking into) and 
to think against (by reaching beyond) the mythic quality (or spell) of the social totality, this 
context of late-capitalist ‘blinding’ as Adorno has put it, which forces particularity into universal 
sameness. If the form of tragedy survives, then maybe it will be because it is a poetic form that 
allows us to look into the abyss of our self. For, as Adorno has noted in his discussion of 
Hölderlin, and which in my opinion resonates with the aims of performance philosophy: ‘[w]hat is 
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